Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? This paper attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems inluence macroeconomic performance. We ind that presidential regimes consistently are associated with less favorable outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, higher and more volatile inlation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of the efect is sizable. For example, annual output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inlation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher under presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The diference in distributional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 12 to 24% worse under presidential systems.
Introduction
The proliferation of independent nations following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s revitalized the debate on constitutional rules, in particular on the forms of government. 1 In his seminal paper, Linz (1990) argued that presidential regimes-wherein the 1 3 president is the chief executive oicer and is elected by popular vote-are less conducive to stable democracy than parliamentary regimes, pointing to the 'perils of presidentialism' on two grounds. 2 First, in presidential systems both the president and the assembly compete for legitimacy, frequently leading to divided government, with serious implications for the stability of democratic systems. Second, presidential regimes are associated with signiicant rigidity owing to both the single person nature of the oice and the ixed terms associated with it. In contrast, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) assert that presidential regimes also have advantages that may counterbalance some of their handicaps. For example, it is argued that presidential systems ofer greater choice to the electorate who cast votes both for the chief executive and the legislative assembly. In addition, it is suggested that a more direct link exists between the choices made at the ballot box and the electoral outcomes under presidentialism, in contrast to parliamentary systems in which coalition formation may weaken that link, reducing accountability under the latter. Hence, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) conclude that presidential regimes perform better where presidents have weaker legislative powers and when the political party system is not overly fragmented.
The work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) (PT, hereafter) on the economic efects of constitutions has changed the direction of the debate, initiating a new literature on the implications of political institutions for economic outcomes. By exploring both the form of government and electoral rules on macroeconomic outcomes, PT uncovered well-deined relationships between presidential versus parliamentary regimes and the size and the composition of government spending, budget deicits, output per worker and total factor productivity. In particular, they ind that presidential regimes are associated with smaller governments, lower welfare spending, lower productivity and more pronounced electoral cycles.
A substantial part of the ensuing research efort aimed toward a re-examination of the impact of constitutional rules-regarding both the type of regime (presidential versus parliamentary) and electoral systems (majoritarian versus proportional representation)-on the size of government and the composition of public spending. For example, Blume et al. (2009) ind that having a presidential rather than a parliamentary regime has no statistically signiicant efect on either the size of the government, the scale of corruption, output per worker, or total factor productivity. 3 In contrast, Gregorini and Longoni (2009) , by incorporating a large set of political and demographic factors, conirm PT's inding of presidential regimes being associated with smaller governments. Similarly, by reining PT's measurements and methodology, Rockey (2012) re-establishes the negative and signiicant impact of presidential regimes on the size of government. Interestingly, and in line with Blume et al. (2009) , Rockey (2012) shows that the relationship disappears when the sample is extended to contain the new democracies of the 1990s.
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether certain forms of government are associated with better macroeconomic performance, a topic that has received much less attention in the existing literature. Even though the size of government, the scale of corruption and the composition of public spending (as studied in the existing literature) are important dimensions of policy outcomes, those variables would not form the standard set of macroeconomic performance indicators. Two exceptions to the above-mentioned studies explore the role of constitutions on economic growth: while Gerring et al. (2009) ind a negative role 1 3 of presidentialism on GDP per capita, Knutsen (2009) , in an extended sample, inds no relationship between the form of government and economic growth. 4 In this paper we explore the role of regime type on output and the volatility of output, inlation and the volatility of inlation, examining links that largely are unexplored in the existing literature. 5 In addition to those four indicators, we extend our analysis to the link between regime type and income inequality. The reasons for including income inequality in our analysis are twofold. First, the level of inequality is an important determinant of political and economic instability with major implications for macroeconomic performance, as widely documented (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996; Campos and Nugent 2002) . Second, a steady rise in income inequality has been observed almost universally, reaching record levels at present, which makes it crucial to understand its potential sources (OECD 2015) . 6 In order to systematically link macroeconomic outcomes to the form of government, we utilize an annual dataset for 119 countries over the 1950-2015 period and construct an extensive set of performance indicators. We then formally examine the implications of the government system on each of those outcomes. Our indings clearly point to compelling advantages of parliamentary systems. For example, we ind that countries run by presidential regimes consistently exhibit slower output growth, higher and more volatile inlation as well as greater income inequality relative to those under parliamentary regimes. Importantly, we ind that the diferences between the outcomes under the two systems are sizable: for example, the gap between annual output growth under presidential regimes relative to parliamentary ones varies between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points. Similarly, in countries run by presidential systems inlation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher than in those under parliamentary regimes. The diference in distributional outcomes is even starker; the distribution of income is between 12 and 24% more unequal under presidential systems.
A common concern in analyses of the link between institutional structure-including the form of government-and economic outcomes is the potential endogeneity of institutions. For example, it may be the case that constitutional forms are determined by economic conditions, such that the causal direction of the relationship between the government system and economic outcomes will not be straightforward. In light of such widely acknowledged endogeneity concerns, we subject our results to a battery of robustness checks as well as a number of remedial actions including instrumental variables estimation and the Heckman correction procedure. We show that our main indings regarding the role of the form of government on economic performance remain intact in a wide range of alternative speciications. 4 John Carey also related economic outcomes to constitutional regimes, although less formally, in his keynote address to the Conference on Coalitional Presidentialism at St Antony's College, Oxford, on May 2, 2014. In his analysis, Carey inspects a set of outcomes such as wealth, economic inequality, poverty mitigation, corruption, the homicide rate, rule of law and accountability across presidential versus other regimes. 5 Indeed, the basis of the loss function widely utilized in the policy games literature is the policymaker's aversion to high and volatile inlation as well as to low and volatile output. See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983) , among many others. More recently, Woodford (2003) shows that such a framework is a good approximation for policymaking in much richer models with microfoundations. 6 It is now believed widely that the substantial deterioration in income inequality was a key factor in a number of recent electoral surprises, including the United Kingdom's referendum in June 2016 to leave the European Union, the presidential elections in the United States in November 2016, as well as the recent parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom in June 2017 (see, for example, Bell and Machin 2016).
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What are the policy implications of examining the role of government systems on economic performance? Although constitutions remain in place for long periods of time, countries periodically consider constitutional amendments, including changes in the system of governance. Indeed, Hayo and Voigt (2010) identify 123 changes in the form of government in 169 countries from 1950 to 2003. Their evidence includes ten post-Soviet Union countries moving from presidential to parliamentary systems in the 1990s as well as ten countries in North Africa and Middle East that switched their regimes in the opposite direction. More recently, France has made changes to its constitution in the direction of a parliamentary system (see, for example, Rogof 2011) . Similarly, constitutional reform has been on the agenda in a number of countries in the Middle East since the widespread protests, referred to as the Arab Spring, starting in 2011. Also, at present, Turkey is in transition from its current parliamentary system into a presidential one, following a referendum in April 2017, while widespread protests have arisen in Venezuela and Poland recently over proposed constitutional changes. We believe that establishing the link between forms of government and economic outcomes serves a signiicant purpose by providing an important piece of information for constitutional framers in countries considering regime changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, the data and descriptive statistics. Our formal empirical results are presented and examined in Sect. 3, which also contains our treatment of potential endogeneity issues, along with some additional robustness checks. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
Estimation strategy and data 2.1 Methodology
To assess the role of the form of government on macroeconomic performance, we estimate the following cross-country panel regressions:
where Y i,t represents the dependent variable of interest (levels and volatility of economic growth and inlation, as well as income inequality) in country i in period t, Pres i,t and Maj i,t are measures representing the form of government and voting rule, respectively, and X i,t are a set of control variables, speciic to the dependent variable in each case. Although our focus is on the form of government, it has been shown that voting rules also matter for economic outcomes; as such, we include variables for both types of constitutional rules (see, for example, PT; Blume et al. 2009; Rockey 2012) .
We estimate regressions of speciication (1) using generalized least squares with random efects and time dummies for each period. As a benchmark, we utilize 15-year horizons for each panel (as is common in the literature), starting from 1965, thus providing three (unbalanced) panels for each country in the regression. 7 For each regression, three speciications are estimated incorporating three alternative sets of control variables in X i,t : irst, a regression with no control variables; second, a speciication with a limited number of control variables and, third, one with an extended set of regressors. As collinearity exists
1 3 between the form of government and other independent variables entered into the regressions, this sequential process will aid further understanding of the results.
Data and constitutional variables
We use data from a variety of empirical sources as discussed in "Appendix 1", which provides a full description of all variables; where available, all data are collected over the 1950-2015 period. We utilize two data sources for our measures of the form of government, each employing subtly diferent deinitions. The irst is from Bormann and Golder (2013) (BG, hereafter) , who deine presidential systems as those wherein the head of state cannot be removed by the elected assembly, as proposed by Cheibub et al. (2010) . In addition, a country wherein a popularly elected president can be removed by the assembly is classiied as operating in a 'semi-presidential' regime. All other regimes are parliamentary. PT follow a similar methodology, classifying a parliamentary government as one that can be subject to a conidence vote; correspondingly, a system for which a conidence vote is lacking is deined as a presidential government. 8 Table 1 illustrates the countries categorized into each form of government by the two data sources; as is observed from the table, the only diferences between the two sources are with respect to the 'semi-presidential' classiication and the data coverage. The underlying classiication of regimes into presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes also is presented geographically in Fig. 3 in the "Appendix 1". Table 2 presents the full sample means for each of the ive dependent variables in our analysis, under presidential and parliamentary systems, based on both the BG and PT classiications. As can be seen, in a great majority of the cases average macroeconomic outcomes are more favorable under parliamentary regimes relative to those under presidential ones, and the diferences between the two systems frequently are statistically signiicant. Using the lower end of our estimates, on average, parliamentary countries grow 0.7 percentage points per annum faster than the presidential ones; have 4.6 percentage points lower inlation; have smaller variations in inlation; and have less income inequality. 9 As is also clear from Table 2 , the disparities in macroeconomic outcomes are larger and more statistically signiicant when using the PT deinition of forms of government; those diferences stem from PT's smaller sample and are not explained by diferences in country classiications between the two presidential variables. Figure 1 presents histograms for our ive performance indicators under both parliamentary and presidential regimes. It is observed that for every macroeconomic outcome, with the exception of growth volatility, the better performance of parliamentary regimes relative to presidential ones is consistent throughout the sample and is not driven by outliers. Figure 2 presents scatter plots for countries along the metrics for which the diferences reported in Table 2 are statistically signiicant. In each plot, a point represents a country and solid lines illustrate the median value for each of the macroeconomic outcomes. In the Descriptive statistics based on whole sample averages. For each of the ive variables represented in the irst column, the mean is calculated under both presidential ('Pres') and parliamentary ('Parl') regimes, with both the standard deviation (in parentheses) and number of observations presented underneath. In the fourth and seventh columns the diference between these two means are presented, with p values from t-tests presented underneath (in parentheses). A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Both BG and PT are used in classifying presidential versus parliamentary regimes; in the case of the former, semi-presidential systems are not included in the analysis across parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures 1 3 left-hand panel of Fig. 2 the top-left quadrant represents those countries of above-average economic growth and below-average income inequality. In this good-outcomes quadrant, 91% of countries are parliamentary, representing half of all parliamentary countries. In the bottom-right quadrant, representing worse than average outcomes for economic growth and inequality, 61% are presidential countries, representing half of all presidential countries.
Descriptive statistics
Similar results are found in the right-hand panel wherein the best outcomes are those found in the bottom-left quadrant, namely, below-average levels and volatilities of inlation. In that quadrant 80% are parliamentary countries (nearly half of all parliamentary countries), whereas in the opposing top-right quadrant 48% of observations are from presidential countries (representing 63% of all presidential countries).
Forms of government and macroeconomic outcomes
In this section, we present and discuss the efects of the government systems on ive separate outcome measures, as set out above. They are each taken in turn and are based on empirical results from estimating speciication (1).
Endogeneity concerns
An important issue in identifying the efects of constitutional rules on macroeconomic outcomes is related to the potential endogeneity of political institutions. The concern is that economic conditions could inluence the choice of constitutional forms and, thus, the causal direction of outcomes is not straightforward. Such endogeneity issues arise from two main sources: irst, the limited in-country variation between forms of government means that statistical inference is based on cross-country analysis; second, any decision on the form of government is unlikely to be truly exogenous to the political and economic for parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures. The solid lines in each plot represent median outcomes for each metric across all countries climate of the country. 10 Applying ordinary least squares estimation relies on conditional independence, that is, the selection of the form of government is assumed to be random after controlling for all other variables [X in (1)]. Following PT, we take two remedial actions: instrumental variables estimation and the Heckman correction procedure.
Instrumental variables
The most widely used strategy in the face of potential endogeneity concerns is instrumental variables. In that approach, the bias caused by the selection of the form of government in a given country being non-random is irst estimated prior to estimating the size of the coeficient θ in (1). We follow PT in selecting our set of instruments: variables indicating the time when a country's current constitutional form was adopted (using dummy variables for periods before 1920, between 1921 and 1950, between 1951 and 1980, and beyond 1981) ; the age of democracy within a given country (measured as the length of time in which the Polity database score of a country consecutively has been positive); language variables representing Western inluences in the country; and the country's latitude. 11 Furthermore, similar to PT and Rockey (2012) we apply the same instruments for the Heckman correction procedure, explained below. Acemoglu (2005) argues that the chosen variables make for weak instruments, as the constitutional timing variables have limited statistical signiicance and the main determinants are the Hall and Jones (1999) variables of language and latitude, variables that Acemoglu (2005) argues are not convincing instruments for constitutional features. Rockey (2012) reines the constitutional timing variables to gain more explanatory power for the form of government in two ways: one set of variables are for when a country genuinely holds a democratic election within a given constitutional framework (and not just when the constitution becomes law), and a second set of dummy variables indicating when a country's constitution is promulgated. Rockey (2012) demonstrates that those factors provide better instruments for the form of government.
Our approach is to consider three separate sets of instruments, using the constitutional timing dummies as in PT, as well as the two sets of timing dummies from Rockey (2012); all sets of instruments also include the age of democracy, language variables and the country's latitude. Table 3 reports results from irst-stage estimates using those three sets of instruments. All have signiicant explanatory power, with irst stage F-tests in excess of 30, and even when only the constitutional variables are considered, values of over ten typically are present.
Our strategy throughout the paper is to present results from a panel regression applying generalized least squares and, subsequently, similar estimates from applying both instrumental variables and the Heckman correction procedure. For the latter two, our benchmark instruments will be the constitutional timing variables from PT, as they provide the most consistent performances from the irst-stage regressions for both institutional timing and 11 A full list and deinitions of the variables in our analysis can be found in "Appendix 1". 10 On the other hand, evidence on the insigniicant inluences of economic variables on the form of government comes from Hayo and Voigt (2010) , who present a comprehensive analysis of the sources of constitutional changes. They ind that changes in the form of government-in either direction-are inluenced by political factors, such as the characteristics of the political system, political leaders and political conlict, but not economic and sociodemographic factors. Table 3 Instruments for the form of government A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Results from irst stage regressions of the proposed instruments for the form of government. The irst column represents the set of constitutional timing variables used as instruments (in conjunction with latitude and language instruments): PT being those constitutional dummies used in PT; and 'Rockey promulgated' and 'Rockey elections' representing similar timing dummy variables from Rockey (2012) when a constitution was promulgated and when free elections were held, respectively. The instrument set are deined as follows: con81, con5081 and con2150 refer to dummies representing that the constitution in the relevant country was adopted after 1981; between 1950 and 1981 and between 1921 and 1950, respectively . EurFrac and EngFrac are the fractions of the population speaking one of the European languages and English, respectively. Latitude denotes the latitude of the capital city, and DemAge is the length of time over which the country in question has been operating in a democracy. FrankRom is the trade share of the economy from Frankel and Romer (1996) .
Each set of instruments are tested to determine how well they it our three measures of forms of government: the scale variable using the classiication from BG where semi-presidential regimes score 0.5, presidential regimes 1, and zero otherwise; the dummy variable classiication using BG (BGd); and PT classiication. The bottom three rows display F-test statistics on the irst stage regression for all instruments ('F-test all'); for just the constitutional timing variable ('F-test gov'); as well as the R 2 statistic from the irst stage regression Hall and Jones's (1999) variables. Our models are estimated on all sets of instruments to ensure that the results are robust.
Heckman correction estimation
Another strategy in testing for possible endogenous relationships in the causal direction, as is also utilized by PT, is the Heckman correction procedure. With that method, a potential selection bias in the observations that are utilized in the regression analysis is controlled for by adjusting estimates for a possible correlation between the random elements in macroeconomic outcomes and the selection of constitutional provisions. In the irst stage of a Heckman correction, a probit regression is estimated on constitutional selection. Similar to PT, we enter dummy variables for the date on which the country's constitution was established, the age of democracy, 'cultural inluences' on the population (the proportion of people who speak English or another European language), and the country's latitude. Table 4 presents panel regression results estimating the impact of the form of government on rates of annual GDP growth, utilizing generalized least squares with random efects. We incorporate standard control variables in line with Barro (2007) . For each regression speciication, three separate measures are entered to represent the form of government: a tripartite variable set equal to 0.5 for countries classiied in BG as semi-presidential, 1 if presidential, and 0 if parliamentary; a second speciication using the 'semi-presidential' and 'presidential' classiications from BG as dummy variables; and a similar speciication using the data from PT, as discussed in Sect. 2.2. The relevant control variables comprise InitialGDP, which represents the natural logarithm of a country's GDP per capita; Education, measured by the log of the average number of years of the population's educational attainment; Fertility and LifeExp, measured by the log of the number of births per woman and life expectancy measured at birth, respectively; GovtSize, deined as the ratio of total government spending to GDP; and ExRateVol, measured as the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate between the domestic currency and the US dollar. The irst four of those variables are measured at the start of the panel period, whereas the inal two are taken as averages over the full sample. Table 4 presents estimation results from three sets of empirical speciications: one with no control variables; one for a benchmark speciication wherein the control variables are composed of InitialGDP and Education; and an extended set incorporating all further control variables.
Economic growth and volatility
The estimation results in Table 4 point to a clear association between constitutional rules and economic growth: the average growth rate of GDP is slower under presidential regimes by between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points (consistent with the results from Table 2 and the top left-hand panel in Fig. 1) ; the efect is statistically signiicant at the 1% level in the six speciications with no and less than a full set of control variables, and at 5% when additional controls are entered. Note that at low levels of initial income, Table 4 suggests that presidential countries will grow faster, consistent with the convergence hypothesis; that is, lower (initial) GDP per capita is associated with faster growth rates such that poorer countries catch up with richer ones. Indeed, if estimations are performed on regressions similar to those in Table 4 without controlling for initial GDP, statistically insigniicant 1965-1979, 1980-1994 and 1995-2009 including time dummies and a constant (not presented). Results from columns (1), (4) and (7) present those using the scale variable of the form of government using BG, in columns (2), (5) and (8) dummy variables for both types of government from the BG, and similar in (3), (6) and (9) for presidential data from PT. A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. P values of t-statistics are in parentheses where heteroskedastic clustered robust standard errors have been used (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1 3 12 More generally, suppose that a dependent variable (Y t ) is a function of two independent variables (X 1,t and X 2,t ) such that Y t = α + β 1 X 1,t + β 2 X 2,t + ε t is estimated; and X 2,t also is a function of X 1,t such that X 2,t = λ + γX 1,t + e t . Substituting the second speciication into the irst one yields Y t = [α + β 2 λ] + X 1,t [β 1 + β 2 γ] + [β 2 X 2,t e t + ε t ]. It therefore follows that the impact of X 1,t on Y t is both direct (estimated through β 1 ) and indirect (through the efect X 1,t has on X 2,t ). If Y is economic growth, X 1 our measure of the form of government and X 2 (initial GDP), where β 1 < 0, β 2 < 0 and γ < 0, then the total estimated impact of presidential regimes on economic growth is smaller than the direct efect.
coeicients are attached to the form of government variable in columns (7)-(9). 12 Presidential regimes are associated with lower levels of education, life expectancy, trade openness and higher fertility rates (with statistically signiicant correlation coeicients), all of which are also associated with slower economic growth. Collinearity explains why the estimated coeicients attached to the form of government variable become smaller in Table 4 in speciications (7)-(9) than in speciications (3)-(6), along with why statistical signiicance declines. The results from Table 4 support the convergence hypothesis: conditional on the level of initial GDP per capita: countries with presidential regimes grow slower than those with parliamentary ones. 13 Table 5 presents results from estimating the efect of the form of government on economic growth using instrumental variables and Heckman correction techniques, as discussed in Sect. 3.1. For all nine speciications, the sizes of the estimated coeicients of interest increase for both the instrumental variable and Heckman correction techniques. Furthermore, the coeicients are estimated more precisely and are statistically signiicant. Presidential regimes exhibit slower economic growth, all else equal.
We repeat the same exercise to examine the impact of regime type on growth volatility, deined as standard deviations in the rates of annual output growth. The control variables entered into this speciication are the same as those above, with additional variables measuring democracy (Polity) taken from the Polity IV database, and the volatility of trade openness (OpenVol). As can be seen from Table 6 , no statistically signiicant association between regime type and the volatility of economic growth emerges in our regressions; these results reconcile with those from Table 2. The same holds true for the electoral system, except in two speciications, wherein majoritarian electoral regimes are estimated to result in less output volatility. When performing comparable analysis as in Table 6 using instrumental variables and the Heckman correction, similar results prevail: a statistically insigniicant relationship between the form of government and output growth volatility is estimated (not reported).
Inlation and its volatility
We now turn to the potential inluence of the form of government on inlation performance (its rate and volatility). We estimate the speciication in (1) wherein the dependent variable is the mean of the transformed GDP delator. The GDP delator, π, obtained from the World Bank, is transformed using π/(1 + π) to remove the impact of high inlation outliers (as identiied in Cukierman et al. 1992) : entering the raw inlation igures would weight unduly a few outliers of very high inlation rates. In line with the existing empirical work on inlation, the speciications share common control variables InitialGDP, Openness and ExRateVol. In addition to those controls, we enter a measure irst proposed and developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) of central bank independence (CBI), for which more Table 5 Economic growth: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those presented in Table 4 independence is anticipated to lead to more favorable inlation outcomes. That variable is reserved for the extended regression speciication owing to data availability. Consistent with our earlier results, presidential regimes are associated with inferior outcomes: countries governed by presidential systems experience inlation rates that are on average more than four percentage points higher than for those governed by parliamentary regimes. 14 That efect is consistent across all speciications and is larger when the measure of central bank independence is entered. The signiicances of the coeicients attached to the form of government variable are weakened by the electoral rule, the latter being found to be more consistently and strongly statistically signiicant. Countries with majoritarian electoral rules are estimated to achieve lower inlation rates, by between six and nine percentage points, than those with proportional representation. The weakening of the formof-government results originates in considerable collinearity: parliamentary countries are more likely than presidential ones to adopt majoritarian voting systems. Similarly, as discussed in Sect. 3.2, presidential regimes and initial GDP are correlated negatively. Estimating the speciications by dropping InitialGDP leads to larger and more statistically signiicant detrimental efects of presidential regimes. Table 8 presents results when instrumental variables and Heckman correction estimation techniques are applied. Similar to the results in Table 5 , the point estimates with respect to the instrumental variable method increase; the coeicients are estimated with more precision and more statistical signiicance. 15 The results from the Heckman correction procedure are in line with those from generalized least squares, although they are again estimated with more precision. In general, the results from Table 8 are consistent with (if not stronger than) those from Table 7 . Table 9 performs the same exercise for inlation volatility. Parallel to the indings above, inlation is more volatile under both presidential regimes and proportional electoral systems; however, whereas the results for the voting rule remain signiicant, those for the form of government are less consistently signiicant. This result, again, arises from the presence of collinearity between the form of government and the voting rule: when the regression is run without the latter, the former is statistically signiicant to at least 5% in all speciications. That is, the constitutional framework of a country and the volatility of inlation are correlated, and the voting rule explains inlation volatility better than the form of governance. 16 Table 10 presents corresponding results using instrumental variables and Heckman correction estimation. Similar to above, point estimates are larger using those techniques, and are estimated with more precision, statistically signiicant at the 95% conidence level in all but two of the speciications. In sum, the evidence suggests that countries with presidential regimes have higher inlation rates and more volatility in those rates. A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those presented in Table 7 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instrumental variables Pres 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.090*** 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.075** 0.071** 0.063** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 Heckman correction Pres 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.030* 0.022* 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.031** (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.070) (0.051) (0.064) (0.006) (0.001) (0.034) Semi-pres 0.017*** 0.000 0.008 (0.007) (0.987) (0.381) 15 Note that some of the increases in the sizes of these coeicients is explained by the smaller sample size owing to the availability of observations on the instruments (sample sizes are on average 24% smaller in Table 8 than in Table 7 ). When speciications using generalized least squares are run on this smaller sample, point estimates increase on average by 14%; that is less than the increase in the instrumental variables approach, but accounts for some of the diference. 16 Similarly, dropping InitialGDP from the speciications in Table 9 also returns larger point estimates for the efect of presidential regimes on the variability of inlation, all statistically signiicant at the 95% conidence level or higher. Table 9 Inlation volatility and the form of government A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Dependent variable is the standard deviation for the period of π/ (1 + π) where π is the annual rate of inlation; all variables are as deined earlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1 3
Income inequality
We next turn to the relationship between the form of government and income inequality, a topic of considerable contemporary concern. Income inequality is shown to be an important factor underlying both economic and political instability, with clear implications for overall macroeconomic performance (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996, among others) . When combined with steadily rising income inequality almost everywhere over the past three decades and its record levels at present (see, for example, OECD 2015), we argue that it is important to understand whether the form of government plays any role in distributive outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the irst to examine that relationship formally. 17 The estimation results in Table 11 point to a clear link between the form of government and income inequality: presidential regimes are associated with Gini coeicients between 12 and 24% larger than those of parliamentary regimes. These results reconcile with those from Table 2 and Fig. 1 . Similar to indings reported above, dropping variables measuring initial GDP, the size of government, or both, provide results quantitatively similar to those in Table 11 . Finally, Table 12 presents similar results from applying instrumental variables and Heckman correction procedures. When those techniques are adopted, point estimates for the coeicients of interest increase in magnitude and are estimated with more precision.
Overall, our results in this section establish that macroeconomic outcomes in parliamentary regimes are superior to those under presidential systems. We ind that growth is faster, that inlation is slower and less volatile, and income is distributed more equally in parliamentary systems.
Table 10 Inlation volatility: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those presented in Table 9 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental variables
Pres 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.048*** 0.043** 0.047*** 0.026 0.056*** 0.056*** 0. A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those presented in Table 11 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sensitivity
We test the robustness of our results by entering a number of diferent explanatory variables in the speciications reported above. Both the level of democracy (Polity) and the stock of democratic experience (the number of consecutive years the country has been judged to be democratic, DemAge) are included in one of our robustness checks. In another, the continental indicator variables of PT are entered into the speciications to test for the role of geography; as Fig. 3 demonstrates, presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and Africa. A variable measuring the proportion of the population that practices a protestant religion also was tested, following the existing studies of religiosity and macroeconomic performance (see, for example, Becker and Woessmann 2009) . In all cases, entering those variables into our previous speciications had limited efect on the quantitative estimates and statistical signiicances of the link between the form of government and macroeconomic outcomes. Estimates from these speciications can be found in the supplementary material ("Appendix 2").
We also re-estimated the instrumental variable and the Heckman correction procedures using the constitutional timing variables from Rockey (2012) (see Sect. 3.1 for a discussion of those variables) instead of those applied in PT. The re-estimations returned results similar to those presented above for both the instrumental variable and Heckman techniques. The instrumental variable speciications also were re-estimated with generalized methods of moments, which again yielded results similar to those above, with the same conclusions reached. See the supplementary materials ("Appendix 2") for those results.
Conclusions
This paper examines the link between the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and macroeconomic performance using data from a large number of countries over the 1950-2015 period. Our set of measures include output growth and its volatility, inlation and its volatility, as well as income inequality. We ind clear diferences in outcomes under the two regimes studied. More speciically, we ind that presidential regimes consistently are associated with inferior macroeconomic outcomes. Output growth is estimated to be between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower, inlation is at least four percentage points higher and income is 12 to 24% more unequal under presidential systems than under parliamentary regimes.
Why do presidential regimes produce worse economic outcomes than parliamentary systems? To answer this question, it is crucial to understand the wider institutional context in which the two systems operate. It has long been recognized that institutions, whether political, legal or economic, play a key role on economic outcomes through aggregating conlicting interests into public policy and imposing constraints on economic behaviour. One can therefore envisage that constitutional rules shape economic outcomes through their role on the form of institutions and, in turn, through the inluence of institutions on economic policy and hence economic performance. We believe that a systematic analysis of institutions across the two forms of government should form a key part of the attempt in answering this question and hence is an important task for future research.
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Appendix 1
See Table 13 and Fig. 3 . Measure of the feasibility of change in policy given the structure of a nation's political institutions and the preference of the actors that inhabit them; data obtained from the POLCON database Parties
Efective number of electoral parties in an election where an average is taken over the time period of the panel; data obtained from BG EthPol A measure of the polarisation of ethnicity in a given country; data obtained from Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005) SocPart A measure of society participation through the degree to which policy makers consult society; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database Fig. 3 Presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. Map illustrating parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures
Institutional variables
CivLib A measure to the degree in which civil liberties are respected in a country; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database FreeSpeech A measure to the level in which individuals have freedom of speech within a country; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database FreeExp A variable measuring the level of respect governments give to media and press freedoms; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database 
Appendix 2: Supplementary materials: sensitivity results

The role of democracy
We test the robustness of our results to including both the level of democracy (Polity) and the stock of democratic experience (DemAge). Estimates for the variables of interest are presented in panel A of Table 14 , which reports results using the eighth speciication in Tables 4, 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The two indicators of democracy themselves are estimated to have signiicant impacts on the volatility of GDP growth as well as on inlation and its volatility, with more democratic and older democracies predicted to inluence those outcomes favorably. Despite this, as can be seen from Table 14 , entering those variables has very little efect on the quantitative estimates and statistical signiicances of the link between the form of government and macroeconomic outcomes (a conclusion that also holds across diferent speciications, not just the eight from Tables 4, 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 ; those results are not reported).
3
The role of geography
As demonstrated in Fig. 3 , presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and Africa. In order to test the robustness of results to geographical location, we apply PT's grouping and enter dummy variables for countries belonging to the OECD, along with regional indicators for nations in Latin and South America, Africa, and Southern and East Asian countries (leaving a benchmark group containing non-OECD European countries and those from the Middle East). In panel B of Table 14 we present results using the eight speciications in Tables 4, 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, now including these regional dummy variables.
Given the presence of collinearity between the regional dummy variables and the type of government, the statistical signiicance of our empirical results weaken. Lesser statistical signiicance is most noteworthy for the relationship between presidential regimes and economic growth: coeicient estimates change from being statistically signiicant at the 5% level (Table 4) to being insigniicant, although the partial correlation remains negative. In all other cases, however, statistically signiicant results reported in earlier analyses are maintained and, hence, are robust to including regional dummy variables (that conclusion again holds in unreported estimates across diferent speciications, not just the eight one from Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12) . (8) in Tables 4, 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 where only the estimated coeicients of the variable of interest have been presented. Similar results are obtained when using any of the nine speciications from Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (not reported) . In panel A 'Polity' and 'DemAge' are included in the speciication; in panel B the regional dummy variables from PT are included in the speciication; the speciications in panel C include the proportion of the population practicing a protestant faith; and panel D presents instrumental variable results using generalized methods of moments 
